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This paper estimates the relationship between loan price and the number of banks in the 
corporate loan markets of Pakistan. An original data set is constructed that includes loan price 
(interest rate) and market structure (number of banks) in more than 300 geographical markets 
across Pakistan. Variation in market structure (number of banks) along with variation in 
borrower and lender characteristics is employed to identify the factors that affect interest rates 
in loan markets. The findings based on regression result show that a competitive structure 
influences market price as loan rates decline when the number of banks increase in a market. 
Although the statistical evidence goes in favour of the structure conduct hypothesis, the 
findings are not robust across various functional forms. The detailed analysis of the Credit 
Information Bureau data and institutional details documented in this paper will be a useful 
reference for further research on the Industrial Organisation of Banking in Pakistan.  
JEL Classifications: L10, L11 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, I estimate the relationship between the loan price and number of 
banks in the corporate loan market of Pakistan. I have constructed an original data set that 
includes loan price (interest rate) and market structure (number of banks) in more than 
300 markets across Pakistan. The constructed loan data set is based on a loan level 
universe, which includes all loans issued to the corporate borrower between 2006 and 
2012 in Pakistan. I utilised variations in market structure (number of banks) along with 
variations in borrower and lender characteristics to identify the factors that affect interest 
rates in the loan markets.  
The existing literature in the context of developing countries focuses primarily on 
policy interest rate pass-through and the impact of monetary policy on the interest rates 
(Edwards and Khan, 1986). However, there is limited information available on how 
market structure and related characteristics affect loan prices in geographically isolated 
markets. The analysis in this paper bridges that gap by employing market-level loan data 
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to study the price-concentration relationship in the banking industry of Pakistan. To the 
best of my knowledge, this is the first effort to measure a price-concentration relationship 
in the Pakistani banking industry at a geographical market level. The findings of this 
paper can be useful for policy analysis and further research in the industrial organisation 
of banking in Pakistan and South Asia. 
The structure conduct (SC) hypothesis says that an oligopolistic structure of 
markets results in higher concentration and higher prices for loans or lower prices for 
deposits (Berger and Hannan, 1989). Therefore, borrowers will face higher loan prices in 
markets where there are fewer banks, or a smaller number of larger banks, compared to 
markets with a larger number of banks with less market power. On the other hand, 
efficient structure (ES) logic says that a few banks with a larger share of the market 
reflect the efficiency of these banks as they capture the market due to lower cost and 
thereby lower loan prices (Demesetz, 1973).  
In Pakistan both forces can be in operation, as post liberalisation experience shows 
an improved efficiency of the banking industry (Burki and Niazi, 2010). However, the 
outreach of the new private banks is limited to large cities, with negligible banking 
operations in fringe markets (Patti and Hardi, 2005). This results in a higher concentration 
of banks in smaller, geographically isolated markets compared to large cities.   
The positive correlation between market concentration and bank performance is 
well documented in OECD countries (Weiss, 1989). However, since researchers have had 
limited access to micro-level loan data from developing countries, research was restricted 
to aggregate data only. The availability of micro-level data in developing countries has 
improved in the last decade (Khawaja and Mian, 2008) making it possible to work on the 
industrial organisation of the banking industry in these countries.   
Liberalisation reforms in the banking industry started in Pakistan in the 1990s. The 
post liberalisation changes require an inquiry into the banking industry as the new local 
and foreign entrants changed the structure of the market, which potentially affected 
operations of large incumbent market players in the banking industry. The financial 
market reforms included interest rate liberalisation reforms, which allowed banks to offer 
multiple products at different price levels across different markets in the country (State 
Bank of Pakistan, 2004).  
The entry and price liberalisation reforms in the banking industry of Pakistan is of 
potential research interest, but that research is restricted due to the lack of availability of 
disaggregated data. The availability of market-level business loans Credit Information 
Bureau (CIB) data have made it possible to measure the price-concentration relationship. 
As the liberalisation and regulatory reforms since 1990 have changed the market 
structure of the banking industry, it is interesting to explore the connection between 
competitive structure and loan prices. Previous research on post reforms banking industry 
shows a substantial improvement in banks performance and reduction in market 
concentration at the country level (Mahmood, 2009; Patti and Hardy, 2005).  
The entry of new banks in the market potentially changed the strategic behaviour 
of the large incumbents as they were facing less competition before liberalisation 
reforms.
2
  In the early period of the reforms, operations of incumbent large banks were on 
 
2The banking reforms also have direct impact on performance, for instance privatisation changed 
ownership and potentially management practices in incumbent banks. 
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a wider geographical scale. Later, the central bank encouraged small banks to enlarge 
their market and open new branches in locations other than large cities.   
Loan data for each corporate borrower and regional market, and information about 
the branch network at a local level, is used in this paper to estimate the relationship 
between competitive structure and market prices in the banking industry. The simple 
model estimated in the paper shows that interest rates charged by banks decrease as the 
number of banks increase in a market, and the loan price is substantially less in the 
markets where post liberalisation entry has occurred. 
The paper is comprised of seven sections: 
2. Literature review of selected industrial organisations.  
3. Structural change in the Pakistani banking industry.  
4. Data and related issues.  
5. Econometric specification.  
6. Summary statistics and findings. 
7. Conclusion and plans for further research.  
Additional tables and Figures are provided in the data appendix. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A number of oligopoly theories predict that price will increase with the increase in 
concentration in the market. The classic oligopoly theories of Cournot and Bertrand 
imply a negative correlation between price and number of firms under specific 
assumptions for cost and demand conditions (Weiss, 1989).
3
 According to another set of 
early theories, firms in the market start acting collusively when their market share reaches 
a certain level (Chamberlin, 1962). Firms will set a price above minimum average cost 
once they realise they have reached that concentration level. Weiss (1989) and Newmark 
(2004) document theoretical intuition behind a number of price concentration studies, and 
Weiss (1989) includes empirical studies on price concentration conducted in various 
industries. 
The price-concentration studies directly measure the relationship between 
concentration and pricing strategy of banks. The results from these studies are also 
employed to test structure-performance hypothesis (Berger and Hannan, 1989). The 
price-concentration regressions are estimated in literature using various concentration 
measures depending on the availability of data. The conceptualisation of concentration 
measures in some studies captures the nature of competition in the market as well (Tabak, 
et al. 2009). Similarly, the price variable in the estimated econometric equation depends 
on the availability of the data by researchers. For example, Berger and Hannan (1989) 
used deposit rates that banks pay to customers, to test negative relationships between 
price and banking concentration.  In this study, price-concentration equations similar to 
Berger and Hannan (1989) are employed to test for structure conduct hypothesis. 
In this paper, the number of banks in a given market are considered exogenous and 
that is a maintained assumption as discussed in the next sections. However, the 
concentration or number of firms in the price equations are considered endogenous in 
 
3For example, in Cournot model with zero costs, the price will be proportional to 1/N where N is 
number of firms. 
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previous literature (Schmalensee, 1989). In the banking industry the number of banks in a 
town will depend on demand and cost conditions in that town, while loan prices will also 
be determined by the same conditions in that town. For example, a large city with high 
demand will attract many banks as compared to a remote and less commercial town with 
low demand. As argued in the next section, in this study the number of banks in a market 
are treated as exogenous because entry conditions are restricted by licencing 
arrangements made by the central bank. 
The endogenous market structure has received attention in modern industrial 
organisation literature. One approach is to use a panel data method with instrumental 
variable technique in order to fix the OLS bias [Evans et al. (1993)]. Singh and Zhu 
(2008) have used a two-step estimation technique where in the first stage the equilibrium 
model of entry is estimated to predict the number of competing firms in a market, and in 
the second stage, the correction term (derived in the first stage) is used to correct for 
correlation between price and competitive structure. Both of these approaches require 
appropriate data in order to estimate the price-concentration equation.  
Studies such as Evans et al. (1993) require a panel data set while the estimation of 
entry model similar to Singh and Zhu (2008) requires detailed information on demand 
and cost conditions in the relevant markets. There are limitations to construct panel data 
or to estimate an entry model by employing loan data provided by the Credit Information 
Bureau (CIB), the data used in this paper for the analysis.  
 
3.  STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN BANKING INDUSTRY  
OF PAKISTAN 1990-2007 
The banking industry in Pakistan was dominated by five large government owned 
banks until financial reforms started in the late 1980s. Before the reforms, more than 80 
percent of the total banking assets were owned by the five government banks.
4
 The 
remaining market was served by 25 foreign banks operating in urban areas and niche 
markets, and branch operations of these banks were restricted by regulation (Patti and 
Hardy, 2005). The Government of Pakistan initiated broad range financial sector reforms 
in the late 1980s and during these reforms privatisation of state owned banks was 
followed by permission to open 10 private domestic banks and 3 foreign banks in 1991 
(State Bank of Pakistan, 2003).  
A number of new private banks opened in the following years. The number of 
domestic private banks increased from 0 to 15 and total banks went up from 25 to 46 
between 1986 and 1997 (See Table 1 and Figure 1). During this time period, foreign 
bank branches increased from 51 to 75, while local bank branches went up from 
6,955 to 8,446. During the 1990’s the banking industry witnessed substantial growth 
and changes in governance and corporate structure of banks. The initial banking 
reforms were followed by an institutional strengthening of the central bank, where 
the central bank received more autonomy and increased the quality and spread of 
banking regulations. 
 
4Five Banks are, Habib Bank Ltd HBL (1450 branches), National Bank Ltd (1245 branches), United 
Bank Ltd UBL (1082 branches), Muslim Commercial Bank MCB (1025 branches), and Allied Bank Limited 
ABL (760 branches), number of branches in 2008. UBL, MCB and ABL were privatised from 1991 to 1993.  
 Competitive Structure and Bank Loan Rate  381 
 
Table 1 
Number of banks in Pakistan 1990-2007 
 1990 1995 2000 2003 2007 
Government Owned 6 6 6 5 4 
Domestic Private 0 15 14 18 26 
Foreign Private 21 20 20 14 6 
Specialised Banks (domestic) 4 4 4 3 4 
Total 31 45 44 40 40 
Source: Mahmood (2009). 
 
Fig. 1.  Number of Banks and Bank Branches (1987–2011) 
 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan. 
 
Post reforms, market share of the private domestic banks and foreign banks 
increased, but the foreign banks primarily focused on select clients and multinational 
companies (Mian, 2004). The private bank entries, mainly domestic banks, occurred 
during 1991 to 1995. From 1995 onwards, the issuance of licences to open new banks 
was implicitly suspended
5
 and remained in effect during the current analysis period from 
2006 to 2012. However, restrictions on opening of private bank branches (local and 
foreign) decreased, while government banks were restricted in opening new branches. In 
addition, government banks were encouraged to close unprofitable branches (State Bank 
of Pakistan, 2003).  
The introduction of risk based capital requirements in 1997, and later, an increase 
in paid-up capital requirements, was followed by a central bank facilitated merger and the 
acquisition of the banking sector in Pakistan (Mahmood, 2009). All of these 
 
5Motivation of moratorium could be due to bad performance of new banks (Mahmood, 2009), 
proliferation of banks and restricting foreign bank entry (Patti and Hardy, 2005). State Bank of Pakistan issues 





































































































































































382 Amir Jahan Khan 
developments rendered the number of banks quite stable during 2006 and 2012, and the 
number of banks are assumed exogenous in the empirical model. 
The Pakistani banking industry is dominated by five banks with more than a 50 
percent share of total banking advances in 2008. These banks are considered the 
dominant banks with a large market share and an extensive branch network throughout 
the country. The dominant banks owned 5,562 bank branches out of a total of 8,274 
domestic bank branches in 2008.  Although the big five banks are still widely operating 
across the country, their market share has gone down since 1999 (Mahmood, 2009). The 
new entrants have potentially increased competition as the market share of the big five 
banks is declining. The non-price competition, including quality of services and new 
product facilities, has motivated the big five banks to catch up with the new entrants. The 
Credit Information Bureau (CIB) data reveals that the incumbents (big five) and new 
entrants are selling similar products in the corporate loan market. 
The empirical analysis in this paper assumes that the number of banks in the 
corporate loan market was stable from 2006 to 2012. The consolidation process started in 
1997 and negligible new entries in the industry support stagnation in the market structure. 
The number of total bank branches has gone up since 2006, as shown in Figure 1, but that 
includes all branches while the price-concentration analysis in this paper is based on bank 
branches that offer corporate loans to firms. The political situation of the country and 
capital requirement by the central bank might also have forced an implicit ban on new 
corporate lending banks in Pakistan between 2006 and 2012, providing further credence 
to the assumption that a competitive structure is exogenous. 
 
4.  THE CREDIT INFORMATION BUREAU (CIB) DATA 
One of the key contributions of this paper is to employ a unique loan universe in 
order to construct market-level data that includes loan prices (i.e. interest rate), and the 
number of banks for more than 500 markets across Pakistan. The Credit Information 
Bureau (CIB) at the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) provides the loan level universe.
6
 In 
addition, the bank branches data published by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) is 
employed for part of the analysis in the paper. Loan level CIB data and bank branches 
data are collected by SBP to implement “prudential regulation” and are used to regulate 
and monitor financial performance of the banking industry in Pakistan.  
The CIB data used in this paper lists the end of month report for each outstanding 
corporate loan issued between April 2006 and May 2012, and the universe of loans 
includes all outstanding corporate loans throughout the country.
7
 A corporate loan is 
given to business organisations; these include listed companies, non-listed companies, 
and partnerships. Importantly, the CIB universe employed here does not cover single 
person liability businesses
8
 (i.e. the unregistered enterprises owned by individual 
entrepreneurs).   
 
6State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) is the central bank and financial regulator in Pakistan. 
7Only fund-based loans, where actual amount was disbursed, are included in the sample and non-fund 
loans including letter of credit or letter of guarantee are dropped from the analysis. 
8Unregistered businesses owned by individuals are quite pervasive in informal developing economies 
such as Pakistan; in the CIB data, business loans issued to single person owned unregistered firms are 
categorised as consumer loans.  
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The CIB data is of an established quality and has been used in recent banking 
literature (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; 2008). In this paper, it covers a recent period and 
includes new fields including borrower and lender identifier, loan size, interest rate, 
borrower’s type, and loan maturity date. The description of selected variables covered in 
CIB is presented in appendix Table 1A. Khwaja and Mian (2005) augmented the CIB data 
with additional borrower and lender characteristics. For instance, one of their studies 
includes information on the political connections of the borrower. Higher confidentiality 
conditions with the CIB universe employed in this paper restricts the scope of merging 
external borrower and lender details similar to Khwaja and Mian (2005) with the CIB data. 
The CIB data reports a loan in the database until the loan is settled. There is no 
loan identifier in the data, therefore outstanding loans reported over time cannot be 
identified with a numeric identifier. However, as each borrower and bank is uniquely 
identified, I can trace a loan issued by a specific bank to a specific borrower on a given 
date for a given product. Therefore, the loan is defined by the borrower-bank-product pair 
for each reported month. The outstanding loan data is reported in the CIB database for 
each loan until a loan is settled. However, for the analysis, only first time reported entry 
for a loan is used because the main purpose is to measure the relationship between the 
loan price offered by a bank and the number of banks in each market. The price of loan 
and other characteristics can be observed in the first reported transaction. The selection 
on first transaction entry leaves 36,279 borrowers, 107 lending institutions and 260,332 
reported loans in the data. 
Defining the loan market is critical for estimating the price-concentration 
relationship, and this is not free of problems. The loan market in this paper is identified 
according to the location of borrowers (i.e. business location), I have assumed that firms 
borrow locally, or borrow from the nearest town, in case the location is a very small 
village without any bank. There is no published evidence to confirm that firms actually 
borrow locally. However, unstructured qualitative interviews with bank managers and 
CIB officials support the notion that firms borrow locally, particularly for working capital 
loans and other routine services. 
Banks issue loans to local firms in order to lower their transaction cost. In most of the 
transactions, individual guarantees, credit relationships, and physical assets (e.g. land, plant, 
and other physical assets) are employed as collateral for loans. Bank managers prefer issuing 
loans to local firms where verifying collateral is easy and past customer relationships can 
lower the risk of a default on a loan. About 9 percent of total loans issued to the firms that 
borrow from more than one location are omitted from the analysis.  
The market is defined in this paper according to the location of a borrower with 
one central concentration of population, or urban centre, including small locations at 
margins, which in some way are economically connected to the main market centre. The 
notion of market here is similar to the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in North 
America with the exception of villages, as villages in Pakistan are also highly populated. 
In Pakistan, areas resembling MSAs are concentrated around a large town, usually the 
capital of an administrative district. The large town and district have the same name in 
most cases.
9
  However, each district has other towns and villages with a concentration of 
 
9For example, capital of “District Lahore” is the city of Lahore. And the businesses located in industrial 
belts around district towns are likely to be borrowing from banks in various locations of Lahore. 
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population, but varying amounts of economic activity. Therefore, a market can be a 
village, a town or a district capital depending on the location of the market and the 
isolation of that market from surrounding markets. 
The market for a loan can also be identified by the lender’s corresponding bank 
branch. The information about bank name and branch address is confidential in the CIB 
data, however a bank branch can be uniquely identified by the bank-branch pair code. 
This information matched with secondary information on total number of branches 
reveals that a quarter of the total bank branches in the country report data to the CIB. One 
potential reason for fewer reporting branches could be that another branch (e.g. head 
office) of the same bank reports data from non-reporting branches. Therefore, the 
borrower location is a better candidate for designating a loan market than the bank branch 
location.  
 
Loans Sample and Discussion 
There are 260,332 business loans reported in the CIB data between 2006 and 2012 
for 36,279 borrowing firms and 107 lending institutions
10
 across 563 markets. Figure 1A 
in the appendix shows the quarterly trend for number of loans. The number of loans 
declined after 2008 as monetary policy tightened and credit expansion was restricted by 
banks. There is diversity in the nature of banks and in the products that they offer to the 
consumers. About 76 percent of the loans are disbursed by private banks, four public 
banks issue 10 percent of the loans, and two specialised banks command 7 percent 
market share. A large number or the remaining loans are issued by small lending 
institutions.  
The banks offer a variety of loan products for various business needs; the majority 
of banks offer more than 10 different types of loans. There are more than 50 types of 
product offered by banks, but in order to create homogeneity in loan prices for a given 
product, the number of products can be merged according to the nature of product. For 
example, loans are classified as working capital and fixed capital loans. In addition, 
businesses demand some products locally (e.g. to meet routine needs) so that the 
competitive structure in a given location can potentially affect the price (i.e. interest rate) 
for that product.  
Loans are split into subcategories; 46 percent of loans are classified as working 
capital loans or credit lines. Firms usually generate working capital locally as borrowing 
for running finance is quite a regular transaction for a business. Another 25 percent of 
loans are based on various specialised transactions related to foreign trade and foreign 
investment. Specific banks, or bank branches in large cities, possibly issue these loans to 
companies engaged in international trade, and thereby the loan market becomes national 
for these types of loans. In addition, 10 percent of loans were disbursed for fixed capital 
or equipment purchase including lease based capital, and 7 percent of loans were issued 
to businesses related to farming.  
 
10In total forty six banks were in operation during 2006 to 2012 thorough the country, the rest of the 
lending institutions including small leasing companies and Islamic “modarabas” are operational in large 
markets only. The analysis in the main text is based on the data for the banks only, some regressions in 
appendix are based on data for all lending institutions. 
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The disaggregation of loans into different types is useful in order to estimate the 
price-concentration relationship by nature of localisation of product, and empirical 
specifications can be estimated separately for various types of loans. In this paper, 
working capital loans and loans disbursed for miscellaneous routine activities
11
 
(classified as “other type”) are employed in the empirical analysis. 
The key dependent variable, the interest rate, is missing for more than half of the 
reported loans in the CIB data. One possible reason
12
 for the missing observation could 
be that banks are reporting the figure in “KIBOR
13
-+premium %” format in the CIB 
system. This potentially creates a problem, as the Credit Information Bureau (CIB) might 
not be aware of the corresponding KIBOR rate for each transaction, which could result in 
missing values.  Although the CIB reports that either the interest rate was unknown at the 
time of reporting, or the corresponding transaction with missing interest rates are non-
fund based loans (e.g. a bank guarantee). The loan size distribution for the missing 
interest rate cases is quite similar to the distribution of non-missing cases (appendix 
Figure 2A). Therefore, there is less of a chance that missing loan rate data might follow 
some selection pattern.  
Interest rate/loan size: Interest rate data appears to be of good quality based on a 
consistency check presented in Figure 2. The trend in the CIB reported interest rate 
follows the trend in the reported private sector rate in published reports by the central 
bank. The average interest rate during the sample period is 14 percent with a standard 
deviation of 3.6. The trend depicts monetary policy changes during the period with 
monetary tightening since 2008 and a relatively steady interest rate period after 2009. The 
average loan size is PKR 69.4 million,
14
  with 75 percent of loans less than or equal to 
PKR 40 million. Loan utilisation can be determined by the difference of outstanding loan 
and actual loan amount granted. Both variables can be observed in the CIB data, showing 
that three quarters of the loans have utilised more than 50 percent of the allocated loan 
limit. 
On the demand side, less than 5 percent of firms borrow from more than five 
banks at various times, while 75 percent of firms borrow from at most one bank. Private 
firms are borrowers of 90 percent of loans. The firms that borrow from different banks 
over the years could be large conglomerates with better access to credit markets.  About 
88 percent of loans have a maturity date within the sample period, and 95 percent of 




In light of the above discussion, the sample is restricted to loans for working 
capital and other routine services, including loans for fixed capital, machinery and other 
physical capital. Loans for farming businesses and trade related activities are excluded 
from the sample as both types of loans are concentrated in specific markets and disbursed 
by specialised banks. In addition, loans with a missing interest rate are not used for the 
 
11Mainly physical capital  and fixed capital loans. 
12Confirmed in an interview with an anonymised bank manager.  
13Karachi Interbank Offered Rate (KIBOR). 
140.9 million US Dollars. 
15The duration is calculated on the basis of loan issue date and loan maturity date, in some cases loan 
maturity date is also loan extension date and for those cases average loan duration will be longer than calculated 
here. 
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analysis because no imputation for the missing interest rate is required given a large 
sample of loans. The final sample includes 61,044 loans reported by 39 banks, in 302 
markets, over 25 quarters. Summary statistics for main variables are given in Table 2. 
 
Fig. 2.  Quarterly Average Nominal Loan Rate (%) 
 
Source: Author’s estimate based on CIB data. 
 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics for the Variables Used in Regression Analysis 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Interest rate (%) 61044 14.56 3.08 3 20.7 
Number of new banks in a market 61044 29.25 12.64 0 38 
More than 5 banks dummy 61044 0.98 0.13 0 1 
New private bank/lender dummy 61044 0.89 0.32 0 1 
Number of total banks 61044 34.74 12.93 1 44 
Loan Size (million Rupees) 61044 74.42 424.58 0.01 23,328.9 
Loan duration in months 61044 15.37 18.09 0 367 
Private borrower dummy 61044 0.92 0.27 0 1 
Notes: The sample is based on loans issued for working capital and loans used for multiple purposes including 
fixed capital loans, the break up for two categories is give in appendix Table 2A. 
 
5.  ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
The price-concentration hypothesis has been tested in previous research on the 
banking industry using a simple econometric specification, where market 
concentration is treated as exogenous and other exogenous controls are added to 
basic specification (Berger and Hannan, 1989). The framework shows that the 
competition in a given market will affect loan price or deposit rate. In the main 
model, various concentration measures can be employed to proxy competition in a 
given market.  The basic econometric specification presented in Berger and Hannan 
(1989) looks like Model 1 below. 








17 reported in CIB reported central bank
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Where r is interest rate charged by bank i in market j during time period t, conc is a 
measure of the market concentration, usually a Herfindahl index or the 3 firm-ratio is 
used to proxy for the competition in the market, and x is a vector of exogenous control 
variables, the coefficient of potential interest here is . For instance, a high market 
concentration will result in a lower interest rate offered to depositors by the banks 
implying  < 0. The model in Berger and Hannan (1989) predicts the interest rate that a 
bank offers for various deposits. While the loan data employed in this paper reports the 
rate borrowers were paying for a particular loan, depending on loan characteristics, 
borrower characteristics and market characteristics, therefore in this case  > 0 in 
Equation 1. 
I have conceptualised the price-concentration hypothesis in two models. In the 
first model, the key variable explaining variation in loan prices according to market 
competition is a dummy variable, where the dummy takes the value of 1 if the market 
contains at least one bank other than the large banks (BIG5).
16
 The cut-off of “five banks” 
is used to separate markets that only contain old large banks, from the markets that 
contain at least one new private bank. This model is reported here in Equation 2. 
Rijt = 1 + 0 BIG5j + v NEWijt +  privateijt + 0 durijt + 1 dursquareijt  
     +  loanijt +  tt + ijt … … … … … … (2) 
Model 2 controls for the nature of a firm’s ownership where (private) is a binary 
variable that takes value 1 if the loan was issued to a private firm. Duration of loan (dur), 
and size of loan (loan), further quarterly dummies vector (t) is included to control for 
time variation, while variable NEW takes value of 1 if the lending bank is a private 
bank.
17
   
The nature of competition in different markets is unobservable and it is not clear 
how the five large incumbents compete with new entrants, so the selection of a 
concentration measure or cut-off based on the number of banks in a given market may 
become arbitrary. As discussed earlier, before liberalisation, five government-owned 
banks dominated the banking industry in the country. During the reforms, four of these 
banks were privatised. There was also an issuance of licences to new private banks. In 
this context, the competition in a location can be viewed as the presence of private banks 
other than large old banks
18
 in the market as presented in model 2. However, intuitively, 
competition in a market increases with the presence of any additional bank; including 
fringe banks, as the regulator has set a level playing field for all banks in the industry. 
Therefore, model 2 is modified with the inclusion of the number of total new banks in the 
market.  
The quadratic form is assumed in the Model 3 given below where BANK  is the 
number of new banks in a given market. 
Rijt = 2 + 1 BANKj + 2 BANKj  + v1 NEWijt + 1 privateijt + 2 durijt  
     + 3 dursquareijt + 1 loanijt + 1 tt + uijt … … … … (3) 
 
16The large old banks mainly five banks, number of branches given in foot note 4. 
17Complete list of dependent variable, exogenous variable and controls are given in Appendix Table 4A.  
18The summary statistics in Table 1 shows 98 percent loans are issued in markets that contain at least 
one bank other than large old banks, so the result in specifications using BIG5 should be taken with caution. 
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In Equation 3, the number of new private banks (BANK) in the market measures 
market concentration. The important assumption here is that the number of banks in a 
market is predetermined. This assumption is supported by the fact that entry and exit in 
the banking industry in Pakistan between 2006 and 2012 was quite negligible. In the 
latter part of the sample, the number of banks goes down, probably because of the closure 
or merger of small banks, as these banks were struggling to maintain strict reserve capital 
requirements introduced under banking regulation. The CIB data shows that small banks 
were mainly operating in very large markets with little impact on market structure in 
most of the medium and small markets. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) can estimate 
models 2 and 3. Although standard errors need to be adjusted for the source of variation 
in data and preferably clustered at market level, the estimation and results are discussed 
in the next section.  
 
6.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The price-concentration specifications 2 and 3 are estimated by pooled OLS for 
the samples of working capital loans and multiple purpose loans. The selection of one 
specific loan category into a subsample will be useful to group loan type according to the 
nature of the market for that specific product. For example, working capital is required to 
maintain routine business activities and therefore usually borrowed in the local markets. 
The estimates are based on OLS while clustered standard errors are estimated for 
statistical inference (i.e. clustered at market level). For robustness checks, linear and 
quadratic functional forms (in terms of BANK variable) for equation 3 are estimated after 
controlling for independent variables. The results are given in Table 3.  
The linear and quadratic functional form results for Model 3 are given in column 
(1) and (2) of Table 3 respectively, while results for Model 2 are given in column (3) of 
Table 3. In the linear functional form of Model 3, the coefficient for the BANK variable 
measures the effect of the number of banks in the market on average interest rate. The 
OLS estimated coefficient on BANK reported in column (1) of Table 3 shows that loan 
price for working capital declines by 2.7 basis points
19
 with the availability of an 
additional bank in the market.
20
 This statistically significant finding is consistent with the 
notion that market concentration in a given market is positively associated with the 
interest rate the banks charge to businesses in that market.  
The average effect of an additional bank in the market on working capital loans 
declines to 1 basis point when a quadratic functional form is employed for estimating 
Equation 3, the linear and quadratic BANK terms are jointly significant in column (2) of 
Table 3 for the working capital loans. In the case of multiple purpose loans, the 
estimation of a linear function shows that on average, the loan rate decreases by 3 basis 
points with the addition of one more bank in the market. However, this effect is not 
statistically significant when quadratic functional form is used. 
Other estimated coefficients in column (1) and column (2) of Table 3 are in line 
with  the  corresponding  economic  intuition that the interest rate increases with loan  
 
191 basis point (bp) is equal to 1/100th of 1 percent. 
20The average presence of other competing banks in a market is based on observed Credit Information 
Bureau data. That does not include banks which were present in the market but were not engaged in issuing 
business loans during 2006 to 2012. 
Table 3 
Pooled Regression Results for the Effect of Concentration on Loan Rates 
 Working Capital Interest Rate Multiple Purpose Interest Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Number of new Banks –0.027*** 0.029  –0.034*** –0.075  
 (0.005) (0.021)  (0.007) (0.044)  
Squared number of Banks  –0.001*   0.001  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
BIG5 dummy   –0.268   –1.524*** 
   (0.278)   (0.37) 
Private Bank Dummy –0.841** –0.838** –1.102**    
 (0.274) (0.276) (0.338)    
Private Borrower Dummy –0.154 –0.171 –0.23 –0.455 –0.401 –0.747 
 (0.181) (0.189) (0.189) (0.546) (0.544) (0.543) 
Log Loan Amount –0.245*** –0.239*** –0.291*** –0.080** –0.079** –0.080*** 
 (0.044) (0.041) (0.048) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) 
Loan Duration 0.026** 0.026** 0.028** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 
 –0.009 (0.009) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Public Borrower* Private Bank    –1.620** –1.620** –2.167*** 
    (0.598) (0.601) (0.619) 
Private Borrower* Private Bank 0.554* 0.553* 0.705** –0.669*** –0.725** –0.869*** 
 (0.257) (0.261) (0.272) (0.200) (0.223) (0.159) 
Constant –20.950*** –21.300*** –19.842*** –21.299*** –20.819*** –17.198*** 
 (1.775) (1.727) (1.777) (2.751) (2.734) (2.348) 
Sample Size 43363 43363 43363 7317 7317 7317 
R Square 0.771 0.771 0.767 0.718 0.718 0.714 
Notes: Dependant variable real interest rate annual %, results based on pooled sample 2006–2012, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses clustered at 
market level,  quadratic loan duration terms are included in all specifications, further quarter dummies included in all specifications. R-square for all models is between 0.71 
to 0.77, further Ramsey RESET reject the null hypothesis that models have no omitted variables in most of the specifications. 
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duration, where the loan rate is the lowest for 5 year duration loans for working capital, 
and 8 year duration loans for multiple purpose loans. The interest rate declines with the 
loan size, on average the interest rate declines by 2 basis points with an increase in loan 
size of 10 percent for working capital loans (0.8 basis points for multipurpose loan).  
The private banks charge a lower loan rate than government owned banks and the 
results are significant for the working capital loans sample,
21
 where the average gap is 
above 80 basis points. This potentially has two implications. Firstly, the lower price 
charged by private banks is consistent with selection of high credit worthy borrowers (i.e. 
low risk clients) by the private banks, and secondly, the competition will be higher in the 
markets where private banks are present. The coefficient for private borrower dummy is 
significant for working capital loans, where on average, private firms pay a 34 basis point 
higher loan rate than government enterprises, but significance declines as borrower and 
lender interaction terms are incorporated.  
Specifications in column (3) of Table 3 are based on model 2, where BIG5 is a 
dummy variable separating markets containing at least one new private bank from the 
markets with only large old banks. Although arbitrariness cannot be ruled out in the 
selection of the BIG5, but institutional facts support the inclusion of the intercept shift 
through the BIG5 in model 2.  
The five major government banks in the Pakistani banking industry have 
dominated the loan market over the years (Mahmood 2009). These are the large banks of 
the country, with a wide network of branches, and the liberalisation reforms exposed 
these banks to competition from new private local and foreign banks by the late 1990s. 
The binary variable BIG5 is capturing the exposure of the market to new competing 
banks, and comparing markets with new banks to markets with old large banks, the 
downside of this variable is that only a few markets contain just large old banks. The 
mean of the indicator variable BIG5 is 0.98. However, the estimated coefficient on BIG5 
is statistically significant and shows that borrowers in markets containing at least one 
new bank pay 27 basis points lower interest rate for working capital and 152 basis points 
lower interest rate for multiple purpose loans, compared to markets containing only large 
old banks.  
The competitive structure of the banking industry is influenced by the operation of 
the conventional banks in most of the markets across the country. However, the CIB data 
shows that other small financial institutions, including Islamic finance companies and 
leasing companies, are also lending to corporate borrowers mainly located in large cities.  
In order to incorporate the competitive effect of other financial institutions, model 2 and 
3 are estimated for the sample of loans for all financial institutions, the results are 
presented in appendix Table 3A. The findings that loan rate decreases with the increase in 
the number of banks in a market stays stable in various specifications in appendix Table 
3A, where total number of lending institutions is used to proxy BANK  variable instead of 
number of conventional banks. The relationship between number of banks and loan price 
remains statistically significant in Table 3A.  
Most of the other coefficients in Table 3A are not much different from Table 3, 
although the coefficient of a private lender dummy is higher in magnitude, particularly 
 
21 The effect of private bank dummy cannot be estimated for multiple purpose due to collinearity with 
some of interaction terms. 
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for multi-purpose loans. This is likely because smaller financial institutions mostly issue 
fixed capital loans that fall under the multiple loan category. For example, the coefficient 
in column (3) of Table 3A for multiple purpose loans shows that private financial 
institutions charge borrowers 120 basis points lower interest rate compared to 
government banks, holding other factors constant.  
The nature of competition between small financial institutions and large banks is 
not clear, however the CIB data shows that small institutions are mainly leasing 
companies and Islamic finance companies. The analysis also incorporated additional 
interaction terms for lender type and borrower type for public and private market 
segments. However, a majority of the results are insignificant, although there is some 
evidence that for multi-purpose loans, government companies get loans from private 
banks at lower rates compared those offered to private borrowers by private banks. 
 
Fig. 3.  Types of Borrowers 
 
Source: Author’s estimate based on CIB data. 
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brand loyalty or switching cost). Since before liberalisation, most of the businesses were 
financed by the big 5 banks in virtually all markets of Pakistan. There is a high 
probability that the client relationship between firms and banks continued, particularly in 
the local markets where no post reforms entry occurred. In credit markets with long 
customer relationships, banks can charge marginally higher rates to old customers as 
switching costs might be higher, while new borrowers/firms in large cities can take 
advantage of competition in the market and switch to a bank with lower interest rates for 
business financing.
22
 In markets where large banks are operational, competition is 
neutralised due to customer relationships of a long duration between the big 5 banks and 
borrowers (i.e. brand loyalty or switching cost). Since before liberalisation, most of the 
businesses were financed by the big 5 banks in virtually all markets of Pakistan. There is 
a high probability that the client relationship between firms and banks continued, 
particularly in the local markets where no post reforms entry occurred. In credit markets 
with long customer relationships, banks can charge marginally higher rates to old 
customers as switching costs might be higher, while new borrowers/firms in large cities 
can take advantage of competition in the market and switch to a bank with lower interest 
rates for business financing.
23
 
One possible solution is to check sensitivity of results by employing different 
measures of concentration. There is a limitation on selecting other measures of 
concentration because the other measures of market concentration are available at 
aggregate level over the sample period, while loans are reported quarterly. Therefore, the 
additional concentration measure might not capture the actual impact of market 
concentration on the loan rate. The empirical model can be improved by incorporating the 
entry of a competitive player into the market, but the required information is not available 
in the CIB data.   
Further, the identification of a geographical market is based on the borrower’s 
address as branch details are confidential in the Credit Information Bureau data,
24
 and 
most borrowers reported their main region as the location rather than the detailed street 
address. Therefore, there is a risk that the loan was actually generated by a bank located 
in a market with a high bank concentration, while the loan was reported in the CIB 
system for an urban market according to the main address, and in that market many banks 
were in operation. Similar data reporting issues can potentially dilute the influence of the 
competitive structure of the banking market on the interest rate charged by a bank for a 
given loan in that market. 
Finally, in a large informal economy such as Pakistan, most businesses are 
unregistered firms or firms with single person liability, particularly family or individual 
owned small firms in local markets.
25
 The CIB data reports loans only for organised large 
firms including listed companies, and large corporations (See Figure 3A). The variation 
in borrowing cost for credit is likely to be higher for small businesses across different 
markets, where borrowing cost depends on the nature of competition in the market. As 
CIB data covers only established firms and does not includes single person liability firm, 
 
22This notion is reconfirmed with an unstructured qualitative interview with a leading bank manager. 
23This notion is reconfirmed with an unstructured qualitative interview with a leading bank manager. 
24The branch information might not be very useful in identifying market location as well (as discussed 
in Section 4). 
25Including farming, transport, trade, retail services, and many other small-scale activities.  
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the effect of banking concentration on business loans cannot be estimated for all types of 
firms in the market. Single liability business loans are classified as personal loans in the 
CIB data. For further research, enlarging the sample of loans by including single liability 
firms can provide further insight into the analysis of the structure-conduct hypothesis for 
the loan market in Pakistan.  
 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper estimates the price-concentration relationship for the banking industry 
in Pakistan. It bridges an important gap, as there is no substantial empirical literature 
available on competition and market outcomes of the banking industry in the country at a 
micro level. The simple model estimated here shows that the interest rate charged by 
banks decreases as the number of banks grows in a geographical market. The loan price is 
substantially less in markets where post liberalisation entry has occurred.  
The banking efficiency literature shows that new private banks are operating 
efficiently in the banking industry of Pakistan. This means that low cost entrants are 
creating competitive pressures for large old incumbents. However, the post liberalisation 
private bank entry occurred mostly in large cities, so it may be the case that the overhead 
cost of banks in small-town markets is higher compared to large cities. The increased cost 
of banking in small towns potentially confounded the negative influence of competition 
on the loan price with the positive impact of cost on the loan price.  
On the policy front, the central bank of Pakistan has encouraged banks to open 
branches in small towns and local markets in recent years, as the major post liberalisation 
entry occurred only in large cities, urban centres, and industrial towns. Before any policy 
prescription can be written, the logical question would be to ask what determines the 
number of banks in a given market, and what factors are important for a bank to decide 
entry in or exit from the market. These are important research questions in the field, and 




Credit Information Bureau (CIB) selected variables 
 Lending Institution Code, unique bank identifier 
 Borrower's Code, unique firm identifier 
 Borrower’s location City, Town or District 
 Name of credit facility, type of loan (e.g. working capital) 
 Date on which the credit facility was given to the borrower 
 Nature of facility (e.g. fund based,  non- fund based) 
 Maturity date, or renewal date of the credit facility in case credit line is renewed 
 Limit amount of the credit facility in Rupees 
 Principal outstanding amount against the facility including interest rate  in Rupees 
 Nature  and value (in Rupees) of collateral against the loan facility provided by the bank 
 Interest rate at charged for the loan (Annual Percentage Rate - APR ) 
 Borrower’s credit rating if available , including  internal and external rating 
Source: Credit Information Bureau, State Bank of Pakistan. 
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Table 2A 
Summary Statistics Group Wise 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Loans for Multiple Purposes      
  Interest rate (%) 7317 14.20 3.46 3 20.68 
  Number of new banks in a market 7317 26.56 14.12 0 38 
  More than 5 banks dummy 7317 0.97 0.16 0 1 
  New private bank/lender dummy 7317 0.79 0.41 0 1 
  Number of total banks 7317 31.97 14.51 1 44 
  Loan Size (million Rupees) 7317 120.19 839.10 0.01 23327.97 
  Loan duration in months 7317 15.54 22.22 0 170 
Working Capital      
  Interest rate (%) 43363 14.45 3.04 3 20.68 
  Number of new banks in a market 43363 28.37 13.06 0 38 
  More than 5 banks dummy 43363 0.98 0.14 0 1 
  New private bank/lender dummy 43363 0.90 0.30 0 1 
  Number of total banks 43363 33.84 13.34 1 44 
  Loan Size (million Rupees) 43363 64.98 289.81 0.01 22820 
  Loan duration in months 43363 9.97 9.86 0 240 
 

















































































































































































Pooled Regression Results (All Financial Institutions) for the Effect of Market Concentration on Loan Rates 
 Working Capital Interest Rate Multiple Purpose Interest Rate 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Number of new Banks –0.011*** –0.001  –0.007** –0.041**  
 (0.001) (0.006)  (0.002) (0.015)  
BIG5 dummy –0.890** –0.890** –0.466* –1.485*** –1.462*** –1.569*** 
 (0.283) (0.284) (0.216) (0.29) (0.29) (0.378) 
Private Bank Dummy –0.187 –0.202 –1.124*** 0.27 0.335 –1.597*** 
 (0.182) (0.187) (0.316) (0.50) (0.500) (0.295) 
Private Borrower Dummy –0.236*** –0.236*** –0.207 –0.120*** –0.115*** 0.225 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.170) (0.033) (0.033) (0.518) 
Log Loan Amount 0.027** 0.027** –0.289*** 0.039** 0.039** –0.117*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.048) (0.013) (0.013) (0.031) 
Loan Duration 0.027** 0.027** 0.029** 0.039** 0.039**  0.036** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Private Borrower * Private Bank 0.565* 0.572* 0.685** 0.204 0.14 0.265 
 (0.276) (0.280) (0.260) (0.332) (0.328) (0.353) 
Constant –21.234*** –21.276*** –19.812*** –27.276*** –27.046*** –24.416*** 
 (1.751) (1.749) (1.719) (3.706) (3.699) (3.217) 
Sample Size 43719 43719 43719 8349 8349 8349 
R Square 0.772 0.772 0.768 0.728 0.729 0.727 
Notes: Dependant variable is interest rate annual %, results based on pooled sample 2006–2012, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses clustered at 
market level), quadratic loan duration terms are included in all specifications, quadratic BANK term included in specification (2). R-square for all models is between 0.73 to 
0.77, further Ramsey RESET reject the null hypothesis that models have no omitted variables in most of the specifications. 
 
Table 4A 
Description of Variables Used in the Regression Analysis 
Acronym Variable Description 
r  Interest rate (%) Inter rate charged for each loan 
Number of new Banks Number of new banks in 
a market 
Number of total private bank entered and operating in the 
market after liberalization 
BIG5 Dummy More than 5 banks 
dummy 
Takes the value 1 if loan is issued in a market where at 
least one bank other than the large banks operate 
Private Bank Dummy New private bank/lender 
dummy 
Takes value of 1 if the loan is issued by a private bank and 
0 otherwise 
Loan Amount Loan Size (million 
Rupees) 
Amount of loan in local currency 
Loan Duration Loan duration in months Loan contract duration in months 
Private Borrower Dummy Private borrower dummy Takes value of 1 if loan is issued to a private firm, and 0 if 
a government owned firm 
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